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I. Introduction 
A survey conducted by Transparency International Indonesia (TII) in 2012 revealed that 
about 71 percent of Indonesia’s citizens pay bribes to obtain public services such as 
taxation, civil registration, business licensing, and land services (Martinus 2013). 
Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi or KPK) confirms 
this finding and reveals that the problem of bribery of public officials has been a chronic 
problem in Indonesia’s bureaucracy, not only at the central government but also at the 
local governments (KPK 2014, p. 35). The unofficial payments given to public officials 
with an intention to expedite the administrative process of public services are also 
commonly known as facilitating payments (Argandona 2005, p. 251; Bailes 2006, p. 295; 
OECD 2003, p. 16). According to Argandona (2005), facilitating payments are often 
caused by the uncertainty of public services, hence by giving some money to the public 
officials as the service provider, citizens expect the faster and easier process (p. 254).  
Even though facilitating payments do not directly cause losses to the state finance as other 
types of corruption do, there are damaging impacts resulted by them, such as additional 
costs to the citizens and destroying the ethical foundations of organisation (ibid, p. 252). 
From the ethical perspective, public officials who receive bribes could be said to commit 
unethical behaviour since they have neglected the ethical demands on the public sector 
stressed by Van der Wal et al. (2008), such as the values of incorruptibility, impartiality 
and lawfulness (p. 476). Against the above background, this paper attempts to: (1) analyse 
facilitating payments from the ethical perspectives, (2) identify the main factors behind 
the emergence of facilitating payments in Indonesian bureaucracy, and (3) propose 
recommendations to address the problem of facilitating payments. This paper argues that 
(1) cultivating the culture of integrity within public organisations, (2) mainstreaming 
online services, and (3) strengthening the role of the Ombudsman of the Republic of 
Indonesia are appropriate strategies in addressing the problem of facilitating payments. 
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II. Literature review 
1. Facilitating payments from the ethical perspective 
Administrative ethics is one of the key features of democratic life by which the 
government has to ensure an equal treatment towards everyone. According to Thompson 
(1985), administrative ethics entail the implementation of moral principles which 
determine the rights and duties that public officials should respect when they act to affect 
the wellbeing of society (p. 555). In addition, to satisfy administrative ethics, public 
officials must be able to make a moral judgement towards their action (ibid). Hence, the 
administrative ethics is mainly aimed to specify whether public officials’ actions are able 
to serve everyone’s interests. By receiving bribes for their duties in serving the citizens, 
public officials not only have failed to meet the requirement of administrative ethics in 
making a moral judgement towards their action, but also have violated the moral 
principles. It is because they have moral responsibilities to specific duties attached to the 
position that they hold in the public administration (Thompson 1980, p. 905). 
Discriminating public services to obtain personal benefits in the form of bribes indicates 
the occurrence of unethical behaviour caused by a failure to fulfil the moral 
responsibilities. 
Furthermore, by abusing their position to obtain personal benefits, public officials who 
receive bribes have violated the value of incorruptibility as one of public sector values. 
Van der Wal et al. (2008) define incorruptibility as the ability of government officials to 
perform their duty without being affected by their private interests (p. 470). The failure 
to fulfil the value of incorruptibility thus leads the public officials to commit corrupt acts. 
Hence, according to Larmour (2007), examining corruption from the perspective of ethics 
would lead the focus to the individuals’ behaviour rather than the system in which 
individuals hold a position, even though international arguments would suggest to analyse 
both individuals and systems (p. 8).   
2. Main factors of the presence of facilitating payments in Indonesian bureaucracy 
The problem of facilitating payments is rooted in the poor quality of public services. 
According to the IPAA (2011), a quality public service delivery is marked by its ability 
to meet the citizens’ needs and expectations (pp. 13-14). For instance, business licensing 
is the most complained about service in both central and local governments by which 
investors are discouraged from the intention to invest. Rather than providing simple and 
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fast investment procedures as expected by investors, the business licensing process in 
Indonesia is uncertain, which is caused by the complexity of procedures, the uncertainty 
in the period of the process, and unstandardized costs (KPPOD 2014, p. 1). Hence, 
Indonesia was ranked 91 of 190 countries in ease of doing business as reported by the 
World Bank (2016, p. 7), in which the uncertainty of bureaucratic process of business 
licensing significantly contribute to this rank.  
Furthermore, the deviance between citizen’s expectation of quality of public services and 
actual services delivered by public sector organisations lead to the citizens’ willingness 
to pay bribes to obtain quality services. The TII’s finding reveals that almost all of those 
who pay bribes to public officials admitted that the bribes were intended to expedite the 
process of service delivery (Martinus 2013). This fact implies a deviation between 
citizens’ expectation of timely services and the reality of untimely public services. From 
this fact, it also is possible to conclude that public officials in Indonesian bureaucracy 
have not fully implemented the principle of customer orientation as one essential feature 
of New Public Management (NPM). According to Korunka et al. (2007), NPM requires 
the public administration to focus on citizens as the customers, therefore individual 
customer expectations and needs must be responsively fulfilled (p. 307-308).  
Moreover, the problem of facilitating payments in Indonesian bureaucracy could also be 
attributed to the lack of integrity of its public officials. It is because the facilitating 
payments are commonly made to affect the non-discretionary duties of public officials 
and are not intended to affect the decisions or the outcome of the public officials’ action 
(KPK 2014, p. 4). Ideally, public officials must perform their regular duties to provide 
quality services to the citizens without expecting or receiving anything in return. Hence, 
by accepting bribes for an outcome that is a routine and non-discretionary duty in his 
position, a public official exhibits a lack of integrity. According to Weinreb (2003), the 
value of integrity requires public officials not to behave corruptly in obvious way, such 
as accepting bribes or accepting something in return for officials’ action (p.421).  
However, behaviour of public officials cannot be separated from the organisations’ 
responsibility, as Christensen and Lagreid (2011) argue that the actions of individual civil 
servants determine ethics in public sector organisations (p. 460). Unethical behaviour of 
public officials could be attributed to the failure of the organisations in building an 
effective ethics infrastructure. The OECD (2000) defines ethics infrastructure as the tools 
  4 
and processes built within an organisation which are intended to prevent unethical 
behaviour as well as providing incentives to encourage good conduct of public officials 
(p. 23). Thus, the efforts to improve public officials’ behaviour should also be performed 
through an organisational approach by developing adequate ethics infrastructure within 
public organisations. 
III. Analysis: Addressing the problem of facilitating payments 
Cultivating the culture of integrity within public organisations 
Indonesia has a strong legal foundation to take enforcement actions against the incidence 
of facilitating payments on its bureaucracy. Article 11 of Law Number 31 Year 1999 
concerning Eradication of the Criminal Act of Corruption clearly states that every civil 
servant is prohibited from receiving any kind of gift or bribe in regards to their duties. 
The threat of punishment in the form of prison sentences and fines has also been clearly 
exposed. A civil servant who receives a gift or bribe related to his duties is threatened 
with a maximum of five years prison sentence or a maximum of IDR 250,000,000 
(equivalent to AU$ 25,000) in fines (ibid). However, enforcement of this regulation is 
difficult due to the massive practice of facilitating payments in the Indonesian 
bureaucracy. In addition, KPK as the anti-corruption agency has also faced limited 
resources to deal with cases of facilitating payments which have spread across 
government agencies (Febrari 2015, p. 136). Moreover, Mulgan and Wanna (2011) argue 
that the legal enforcement approach in anti-corruption strategies merely relies on the 
disincentives character of formal regulatory to encourage compliance, hence it has 
potential to be disregarded, and could potentially not cover all of the behaviour associated 
with ethically appropriate action (pp. 416-417).  
Therefore, it is important to develop the culture of integrity as a complementary strategy 
to the legal approach. In general, the culture of integrity would provide greater emphasis 
on the prevention of unethical or corrupt behaviour. According to the OECD (2000), the 
prevention approach would be less expensive than enforcement approach, and it also 
implies a long-term investment in enhancing the public service culture (p. 19). First, as 
the initial step, the President of Indonesia is recommended to issue a regulation which 
requires every public organisation to develop a culture of integrity through the process of 
codifying the organisation’s values and conduct. Broader than establishing a regulation 
as the basis in inculcating public service ethics, this regulation would also indicate the 
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political commitment from the highest leader of Indonesian bureaucracy. The OECD 
(2000) underlines the importance of political commitment as the foundation to encourage 
ethical behaviour in the public administration (p. 24).  
Moreover, every public official within an organisation has to be involved in developing 
both a code of ethics and a code of conduct based on distinctive values and internal 
practices. General values and principles which underpin the organisation’s duties and are 
employed by members of an organisation to make independent judgments in performing 
their duties would then be stated in the code of ethics (Dobel 2005, p. 165). The core of 
public sector values such as incorruptibility, impartiality, integrity and lawfulness should 
be stated in this ethical code as a solid foundation of organizational culture. On the other 
hand, the code of conduct should specify the expectations about which actions and 
behaviour of public officials are required, prohibited and acceptable (Mulgan & Wanna 
2011, p. 423). The code of conduct should also be used to specify the standard of services 
expected when public officials deliver services to citizens, and prohibit them from 
receiving any facilitating payments. Standard of services stated in the code of conduct has 
to be directed to encourage public officials who are in the front line of service delivery to 
better focus on customers.  
Finally, to ensure that members of an organisation have sufficient understanding and 
therefore are able to comply with the code of ethics and code of conduct in performing 
regular duties, induction and training would be essential to reinforce these ethical matters. 
According to Nolan (1998), induction of ethical and conduct codes would ensure that 
every member of organisation has instilled the values and professional practices, while 
continuous training is important to remind the members of the organisation about the 
existence of these rules within organisation (p. 452). In addition, Mulgan and Wanna 
(2011) also suggest the establishment of ‘governance structures’ which consist of senior 
executives or board of directors to administratively enforce the ethical rules within 
organisation (p. 426). Even though building the culture of integrity within public sector 
organisations is a time-consuming process, the objective of changing cultural attitudes of 
bureaucracy towards the higher integrity would possible to be achieved and accordingly, 
any corrupt behaviour including receiving facilitating payments could potentially be 
ceased. 
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Online services to minimise direct interactions between public officials and citizens 
In preventing the incidence of facilitating payments, the government could optimise the 
advantage from the current development of information, communication and technology 
(ICT) to shift public service delivery from a traditional approach, which involves direct 
contact between public officials and citizens, to online services. Minimising the direct 
interaction between officials and citizens in service delivery would reduce the opportunity 
of public officials to receive facilitating payments. According to the OECD (2016), the 
opportunity for corruption, collusion and bribery is greater when there is a condition 
which enables closer contacts between public officials and citizens (p. 7). Introducing 
online services would not only reduce the opportunity of facilitating payments to occur, 
but also represent a significant improvement in the way public organisations deliver the 
services. Larmour (2007) argues that when corruption exists within a bad system, 
significant changes in regulations and procedures are required to diminish opportunity for 
corruption as well as to encourage the alteration of public officials’ behaviour within the 
system (p. 6). 
In addition, providing online services also brings a greater emphasis on customer focus 
by which public organisations deliver efficient services.  ICT-based services enable 
public organisations to deliver services to the citizens in a standardized procedure and 
quality, hence timely and efficient processes could be assured (Cordella 2007, p. 268). 
Moreover, providing equal and impartial services to every citizen without discrimination 
demonstrates the value of impartiality in performing organisation’s duties. In addition, 
mainstreaming ICT-based services among public sector organisations would also 
actualise public sector reform based on NPM agenda. According to Heeks (1999), the 
main objective of public sector reform is to improve the performance of public sector 
organisations (p. 9). Performance improvement could be achieved by enhancing the 
efficiency of processes performed by public sector organisations in achieving the results 
(ibid, p. 13). ICT could be seen as a means to improve efficiency by which manual 
procedures and human efforts are replaced by automation processes, therefore the higher 
efficiency is gained through a significant decrease in staff costs and more time efficient 
processes (Heeks & Davies 1999, p. 23). Even though this recommendation entails 
significant costs needed for initial investment in the ICT system and infrastructure, the 
potential benefits outweigh the costs. Heeks and Davies (1999) note some countries such 
as Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands and the EU countries have succeeded in 
reinventing government by adequately investing in ICT (p. 24).  
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Strengthening the role of the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia 
The Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia (hereafter the Ombudsman) has very 
limited powers in overseeing administrative action. Law Number 37 Year 2008 
concerning Ombudsman mandated the Ombudsman to perform its main duties in 
managing the cases of maladministration in the public sector, starting from receiving 
reports from groups or individuals who experienced injustice caused by 
maladministration, conducting substantial investigation, and making recommendations. 
In other words, constitutional disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman is limited to 
recommendatory. Because of its limited duties, accordingly, the Ombudsman has been 
subject to criticism of its lack of initiatives to perform own motion investigations of 
presumed maladministration in the public sector (Hukum Online 2010). In addition, 
Sherlock (2002) describes the Ombudsman as a paper tiger due to its lack of power to 
enforce its recommendations by compelling public agencies to act on its advice (p. 369). 
Hence, by these features, the Ombudsman could be classified as a classical ombudsman 
as defined by Mulgan (2014, p. 151).  
Therefore, it is recommended to strengthen the role of the Ombudsman by granting it at 
least two additional powers. First, the Ombudsman must be granted a special power to 
initiate an investigation on the sectors where maladministration or illegal behaviour are 
most reported. Rather than waiting for case by case of complaints, the Ombudsman could 
perform its own motion investigation to deeply examine the most prone sectors. For 
instance, the ORI (2017a) reported that among the 9,030 complaints received by the 
Ombudsman in 2016, 18.3 percent or 1,652 complaints were reporting maladministration 
by the Indonesian Police (pp. 2-6). The presumed maladministration occurred in the 
Indonesian Police are including protracted delays, the deviation of procedures, and 
requesting facilitating payments to the citizens (ibid, p. 9). In response to this fact, the 
Ombudsman should ideally initiate a deep investigation into administrative actions 
performed by the Indonesian Police, hence a comprehensive recommendation to improve 
procedures and performance of the Indonesian Police could be advised. Without the 
power to initiate an investigation, the Ombudsman could not conduct this type of 
investigation, and therefore it could not fully perform its role as external adviser to the 
government as suggested by Mulgan (2014, p. 153). It is because the Ombudsman’s 
recommendation would be limited to case by case recommendation, which could not 
comprehensively portray the real administrative problems within public agencies.  
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Secondly, to ensure that the Ombudsman’s recommendations are followed up and are 
implemented, it is proposed to equip the Ombudsman with power to enforce its 
recommendations. The Ombudsman reported that the compliance level towards its 
recommendations in recent years was only about 40 percent (Widianto 2014). In regards 
to this issue, Mulgan (2014) argues that public officials might not always agree with the 
ombudsman’s recommendations, and hence they do not want to implement them (pp. 154-
155). The low compliance level towards the Ombudsman’s recommendations would 
undermine the objective of the Ombudsman in promoting better procedures and 
performance of public sector organisations. 
By possessing two additional powers as discussed above, the Ombudsman could become 
the key player in solving the problem of facilitating payments in Indonesian bureaucracy. 
Since overseeing public services is its main jurisdiction, the Ombudsman could initiate 
an investigation to public organisations that allegedly receive facilitating payments in 
delivering public services. The power to enforce recommendations would ensure that 
public organisations concerned would take appropriate strategies as recommended by the 
Ombudsman to prevent the incidence of facilitating payments. Lastly, the main advantage 
of the Ombudsman is that it has regional offices across provinces in Indonesia (ORI 
2017b), therefore it has adequate resources to perform wide range monitoring of public 
administration.   
IV. Conclusion 
The existence of facilitating payments in Indonesian bureaucracy is mainly caused by the 
poor quality of public services, hence citizens are willing to pay bribes to obtain quality 
services as expected by them. The presence of facilitating payments would also imply the 
failure of public administration to focus on citizens as customers. Public officials who 
receive facilitating payments are violating administrative ethics and commit acts of 
corruption. On the other hand, a public organisation should also be responsible for 
unethical behaviour of public officials, as it is mainly caused by the lack of effective 
ethics infrastructure within the organisation. Therefore, the focus on solving the problem 
of facilitating payments should be directed to build an effective ethics infrastructure 
within public organisations to inculcate the cultures of integrity among public officials. 
First, every public organisation should develop code of ethics and code of conduct as the 
basis for organisational culture and behaviour. These codes must be equipped by 
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governance structures to ensure that both are effectively enforced within the organisation. 
Secondly, mainstreaming the use of online services would not only minimise the 
possibility of the incidence of facilitating payments but also lead to an increase in public 
organisations’ performance by enhancing the efficient processes of service delivery. 
Lastly, strengthening the Ombudsman with the powers to initiate investigation and to 
enforce its recommendation would contribute to address the problem of facilitating 
payments. Once possessing these powers, the Ombudsman could initiate investigations 
to the most prone sectors or organisations as well as recommend an improvement in the 
procedures of service delivery to prevent the incidence of facilitating payments. 
V. References 
 
Argandona, A 2005, ‘Corruption and companies: the use of facilitating payments’, 
Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 251-264. 
 
Bailes, R 2006, ‘Facilitation payments: culturally acceptable or unacceptably corrupt?’, 
Business Ethics: A European Review, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 293-298.  
 
Christensen, T & Lagreid, P 2011, ‘Ethics and administrative reform’, Public 
Management Review, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 459-477. 
 
Cordella A 2007, ‘E-government: towards the e-bureaucratic form?’, Journal of 
Information Technology, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 265-274. 
 
Dobel, JP 2005, ‘Public management as ethics’, in E Ferlie, LE Lynn, Jr & C Pollitt, The 
Oxford Handbook of Public Management, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 156-181. 
  
Febrari, R 2015, Politik pemberantasan korupsi: strategi ICAC Hongkong dan KPK 
Indonesia (Political of corruption eradication: strategies of ICAC Hongkong and KPK 
Indonesia), Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia, Jakarta. 
 
Heeks, R & Davies, A 1999, ‘Different approaches to information age reform’, in R 
Heeks, Reinventing government in the information age: international practice in IT-
enabled public sector reform, Routledge, London, pp. 22-48. 
 
Heeks, R 1999, ‘Reinventing government in the information age’, in R Heeks, 
Reinventing government in the information age: international practice in IT-enabled 
public sector reform, Routledge, London, pp. 9-21.  
 
Hukum Online 2010, ‘Pelayanan publik masih buruk, Ombudsman diminta optimalkan 
peran (Poor public services, the Ombudsman is required to optimise its role)’, Hukum 
Online (online edition), 1 February 2010, viewed 5 May 2017,                                           
<http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt4b670734ebb6c/ori-kom2>.  
Indonesia Regional Autonomy Watch 2014, One Stop Shop Service Agency: The 
Perspectives of Institution and Authority, Indonesia Regional Autonomy Watch & 
Foreign and Commonwealth Oﬃce, viewed 2 May 2017, 
<http://www.kppod.org/datapdf/laporan/FCO-Eng-Research-Report-OSS.pdf> 
  10 
Institute of Public Administration Australia (IPAA) 2011, ‘Getting serious on client 
service’, IPAA Policy Discussion Paper, Canberra, viewed 3 May 2017,                             
<http://www.ipaa.org.au/documents/2012/05/getting-serious-on-client-service.pdf>.  
 
Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) 2014, ‘Indonesia bersih uang pelicin (Indonesia 
against the facilitating payments)’, Corruption Eradication Commission, viewed 1 May 
2017, 
<https://www.kpk.go.id/gratifikasi/BP/Buku_Indonesia_Bersih_Uang_Pelicin_Ind.pdf> 
 
Korunka, C, Scharitzerb, D, Carayon, P, Hoonakker, P, Sonnek, A & Sainfort F 2007, 
‘Customer orientation among employees in public administration: a transnational, 
longitudinal study’, Applied Ergonomics, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 307-315. 
KPPOD, see Indonesia Regional Autonomy Watch. 
Larmour, P 2007, ‘A short introduction to corruption and anti­corruption’, CIES e-Wor
king Paper, no. 37, Centre for Research and Studies in Sociology, Lisbon, viewed 2 
May 2017,                                                                                                                                            
<http://cies.iscte-iul.pt/destaques/documents/CIES-WP37_Larmour_.pdf>. 
Law Number 31 Year 1999 Concerning Eradication of the Criminal Act of Corruption 
(Republic of Indonesia).  
 
Law Number 37 Year 2008 Concerning Ombudsman (Republic of Indonesia).  
 
Martinus, S 2013 ‘71 Persen orang Indonesia menyuap di pelayanan publik (71 percent 
of Indonesian pay bribes to obtain public services’, Tribunnews (online edition), 11 July 
2013, viewed 1 May 2017,                                       
<http://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2013/07/11/71-persen-orang-indonesia-
menyuap-di-pelayanan-publik?page=all>. 
 
Mulgan, R & Wanna, J 2011, ‘Developing cultures of integrity in the public and private 
sectors’, in A Graycar & RG Smith, Handbook of global research and practice in 
corruption, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Chaltenham, pp. 416-428. 
 
Mulgan, R 2014, Making open government work, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingtoke. 
 
Nolan, L 1998, ‘Just and honest government’, Public Administration and Development, 
vol. 18, no. 5, pp. 447-455. 
 
Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia (ORI) 2017a, Data penyelesaian laporan 
masyarakat tahun 2016 (Data of public complaints addressed in 2016), Ombudsman of 
the Republic of Indonesia, viewed 6 May 2017, 
<http://www.ombudsman.go.id/index.php/publikasi/laporan.html>. 
 
Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia (ORI) 2017b, Tugas dan fungsi perwakilan 
Ombudsman Republik Indonesia (Duties of the regional offices of the Ombudsman od 
the Republic of Indonesia, Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia, viewed 6 May 
2017,                                       
<http://www.ombudsman.go.id/index.php/publikasi/laporan.html>. 
 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2000, ‘Trust in 
government ethics measures in OECD countries’, OECD Governance Papers, 
  11 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, viewed 4 May 2017, 
<https://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/48994450.pdf >.  
 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2003, ‘Business 
approaches to combating corrupt practices’, OECD Working Papers on International 
Investment, No. 2003/02, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
Paris, viewed 1 May 2017,                                                                                                        
<https://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/WP-2003_2.pdf>.  
 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2016, ‘Preventing 
corruption in public procurement’, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Paris, viewed 5 May 2017,                                
<http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/Corruption-in-Public-Procurement-Brochure.pdf >.  
 
Sherlock, S 2002, ‘Combating corruption in Indonesia? The Ombudsman and the Assets 
Auditing Commission’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 
367-383.  
 
Thompson, DF 1980, ‘Moral responsibility of public officials: the problem of many 
hands’, The American Political Science Review, vol. 74, no. 4, pp. 905-916. 
 
Thompson, DF 1985, ‘The possibility of administrative ethics’, Public Administration 
Review, vol. 45, no. 5, pp. 555-561. 
 
Van der Wal, Z, De Graaf, G & Lasthuizen, K 2008, ‘What's valued most?                                                                                         
similarities and differences between the organizational values of the public and private 
sector’, Public Administration, vol. 86, no. 2, pp. pp. 465-482.  
 
Weinreb, L 2003, ‘Integrity in government’, Fordham Law Review, vol. 72, issue 2, pp. 
421-425. 
 
Widianto, E 2014, ‘60 persen lembaga tak patuhi rekomendasi ORI (60 percent of 
public agencies did not obey the ORI’s recommendation)’, Tempo (online edition), 7 
November 2014, viewed 7 May 2017,                                                                                             
< https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2014/11/07/078620196/60-persen-lembaga-tak-patuhi-
rekomendasi-ori>. 
 
World Bank 2017, Doing Business 2017: Equal Opportunity for All, World Bank, 
viewed 3 May 2017, 
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/WBG/DoingBusiness/Documents/Annual-
Reports/English/DB17-Chapters/DB17-Mini-Book.pdf?la=en>. 
